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The paper examines the effects of an environmental tax reform in a model of a small open
economy with decentralised wage bargaining and  monopolistically competitive firms. The
economy includes a tradable sector as well as a non-tradable sector and features unemployment
in general equilibrium. Firms in both sectors use labour and an imported polluting factor of
production ("energy"). A tax on energy, recycled to reduce the payroll tax, will in general
affect equilibrium unemployment in this economy. The effect works through a reallocation of
employment from the tradable to the non-tradable sector. Total employment increases if
workers in the tradable sector receive a wage premium relative to workers in the non-tradable
sector. The sectoral relative wage is determined by the relative bargaining power of the unions
and by parameters of preferences and technology.  Parameterised versions of the model suggest
that the tax reform has small effects on employment and that it typically reduces real  *’3.
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Recent years have seen a rapid increase in studies of various aspects of environmental taxation.
This research has primarily been theoretical, sometimes supplemented by numerical simulation
models of the economy. One strand of the literature has been concerned with the so called
double dividend issue. The basic question in this discussion is whether a switch from labour
taxes to taxes on polluting goods or factors of production can achieve both an improvement of
the environment and a reduction in distortions arising from labour taxation; see  Goulder (1995)
for a review of the main arguments.
The popular and political discussions on environmental taxation have increasingly been
concerned with the possibility of reducing unemployment through lower labour taxes financed
by higher taxes on the environment. The conceivable rise in employment from such a reform
has been referred to as a "triple dividend". The idea here is that a reduction in taxes on labour,
for example a cut in the payroll tax, would reduce labour costs and thereby increase
employment. The shortfall in public revenues would be covered by higher "green taxes", and a
cleaner environment would appear as an additional benefit.
Despite the interest that the employment issue has attracted in policy discussions, there has
been rather little research on the implications for unemployment of an environmental tax
reform. Most papers dealing with environmental taxation are based on models with market
clearing wages, which obviously is an inadequate framework for analysing issues pertaining to
unemployment. There are a few exceptions, however. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996)
examine the impact of environmental taxation in an economy with an  exogenously fixed real
consumer wage. In this set-up, an environmental tax reform involving a switch from labour
taxes to green taxes may boost employment under certain conditions.
The assumption of a rigid consumer wage is not very appealing, however. It is at variance with
a large number of empirical studies showing that real wages are responsive to changes in
labour taxes. It is preferable to specify a model where real wage resistance (or its absence) is
derived from more primitive assumptions about preferences, technology and wage setting
mechanisms. Models of wage bargaining are the natural candidates here, but they have only
very recently been invoked in investigations of environmental taxation. The contributions
include Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1995), Brunello (1996), Carraro et al (1996), Nielsen et2
al (1995), Koskela and Schöb (1996), and Strand (1996). The paper by Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg uses a matching model of the type presented in  Pissarides (1990), augmented to account
for a polluting factor of production. Brunello, Carraro et al and Koskela and Schöb consider
models with union-firm bargaining over wages, whereas  Nielsen et al and Strand make use of a
monopoly union model.
Although the claim that a cut in labour taxes is good for employment seems intuitively
plausible, it is QRW a necessary implication from models of equilibrium unemployment. A typical
feature of models of wage bargaining is that equilibrium real wage resistance is crucially
dependent on the "benefit regime", i.e., the characteristics of workers' unemployment
compensation. This is true for models with unions, as in Johnson and  Layard (1986) or Layard
et al (1991), or in matching models with individual worker-firm bargaining, as in  Pissarides
(1990). It holds also for various efficiency wage models. There is in general complete real
wage flexibility with respect to changes in labour taxes if real unemployment compensation is
indexed to the real consumption wage through a fixed replacement ratio. Labour taxes are in
this case completely borne by labour, and there is no effect on employment in equilibrium. The
equilibrium can graphically be described in the real wage and employment space as an
intersection between a downward sloping labour demand (or price setting) schedule and a
YHUWLFDO (long run) wage setting schedule.
If however unemployment compensation is fixed in real terms, i.e., the nominal benefits are
linked to the price level rather than to the wage level, real wage resistance is the typical
outcome in models of wage bargaining as well as in efficiency wage models. The wage setting
schedule is positively sloped in the real wage and employment space, so shifts of labour
demand will in general affect employment. The reason that  indexation to wages gives more
wage flexibility than  indexation to prices is that the former rule causes benefit levels to adjust
downward when real wages fall as a response to a labour demand shift, thus producing an
additional incentive for wage moderation. 1 With price indexation of benefits there is a potential
employment dividend to be reaped from a cut in labour taxes. Whether it actually can be
                                                
1 Pissarides (1996) presents a number of simulation exercises which highlight the importance of the
benefit regime in models of equilibrium unemployment.3
reaped depends, LQWHU￿DOLD, on how easy it is to cover the shortfall in government revenues by
higher taxes on the environment, and on how environmental taxes affect labour demand.
Although wage indexation of benefits is common in many countries, this does not necessarily
imply complete real wage flexibility. A crucial issue is the extent to which the unemployed have
access to other sources of income than regular unemployment benefits, for example income
from capital or the underground economy, services derived from household production, and
perhaps some utility from leisure. These sources of unemployment income are untaxed (and
possibly untaxable), and their presence implies that wage  indexation of regular benefits will not
translate into complete indexation of total unemployment income to changes in real wages.
This is arguably a realistic case to consider, and it is discussed at some length in  Bovenberg
and van der Ploeg (1995), although there is very little hard evidence on the magnitudes
involved.
There is a large empirical literature on the incidence of income and payroll taxes. This literature
typically focuses on how real labour costs respond to taxes, and there are also a few attempts
to directly estimate how taxes affect equilibrium unemployment. The results are not conclusive;
several studies suggest that labour costs are indeed pushed up by higher labour taxes, whereas
other studies find no effects.2 Tyrväinen (1995) and Jackman et al (1996) are two recent
papers that report conflicting results.
The potential for employment gains from lower labour taxes that appears in the model of
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1995) derives from the impact of the tax reform on the effective
replacement ratio. The rise in employment that is caused by a cut in labour taxes hinges on the
presence of fixed elements in unemployment income that makes the effective replacement ratio
imperfectly indexed to the general wage level. Our investigation is concerned with the question
of whether a reform that involves higher taxes on an imported polluting factor of production
                                                
2 An implicit assumption in much of the empirical literature is that the absence of an effect of taxes on
labour costs implies that there is no effect on unemployment either. This implication does not follow,
however, if the price-setting schedule is horizontal, in which case real producer wages would be  fixed
by firms’ price setting behaviour. Labour taxes would increase unemployment in such an economy to
the extent that there is some fixed element in total unemployment compensation, resulting in a
positively sloped wage setting schedule.4
can boost employment even when the replacement ratio is not affected. The answer to the
question is a qualified yes.
The model, developed in section 2 of the paper, features a small open economy with
decentralised wage bargaining,  monopolistically competitive firms and equilibrium
unemployment. There is a tradable sector and a non-tradable (sheltered) sector. All firms use
labour and an imported factor of production. We think of the imported input as a polluting
factor (such as oil) and will refer to it as energy. The polluting feature of this imported factor is
of no relevance in the positive analysis. It will have implications for the normative analysis,
however, as total energy consumption in the economy affects household utility negatively. The
analysis is concerned with long-run equilibrium with balanced trade and  endogenously
determined relative prices and relative wages. 3
We examine the effects of taxes on labour and energy, including a reform where revenues from
the energy tax are recycled to allow for a cut in the payroll tax. It turns out that labour taxes
have no effect on unemployment, which is a standard result in models of equilibrium
unemployment with fixed replacement ratios. Energy taxes are not neutral with respect to
unemployment, however. A rise in the energy tax will in general affect unemployment, and the
direction of the effect depends on the sectoral relative wage, i.e., the ratio between the
equilibrium wage in the non-tradable and the tradable sector. A tax increase induces a
reallocation of employment from the tradable to the non-tradable sector, which in turn
increases total employment if wages are lower in the non-tradable sector. Consequently, if
there is a tradable sector wage premium, a rise in the energy tax boosts employment, whereas
employment falls if wages are higher in the sheltered sector. The  sectoral wage differential is
determined by parameters of preferences and technology as well as the relative bargaining
power of the unions.
Section 3 of the paper contains a brief discussion of the welfare implications of energy taxes.
Even if energy taxes may boost employment, it does not necessarily follow that they are
welfare-improving. Consumers care about environmental quality in addition to the5
consumption of traded and non-traded goods. Energy taxes will affect the quantities of the two
types of goods as well as the amount of pollution. Numerical simulations of the model suggest
that energy taxes in general will provide an environmental dividend but also reduce real  *’3.
￿￿￿7KH￿0RGHO
2.1 The Consumers
The economy consists of a fixed number of identical consumers. The size of the population is
normalised to unity. The individuals consume two types of goods. The first type consists of
goods that are traded on the world market while the second type consists of goods that are
produced and consumed domestically. The utility function characterising consumer preferences




















’FL is individual  i’s consumption of the tradable goods and ’VL  is the consumption of goods
produced in the sheltered sector. The term Y(H) captures the disutility from the aggregate use
of energy, H, in production; we assume  () ¢ > YH 0. The individuals supply one unit of labour
inelastically without loss of utility. The sub-utility for the different varieties of the traded and
































































where NF andNVare the number of varieties available of the two types. The parametersm  and
s are the elasticities of substitution in consumption between any two traded and non-traded
                                                                                                                                           
3 The model has some similarities with the so called Scandinavian model of inflation; see for example
Edgren et al (1973) and the exposition in  Lindbeck (1979). In fact, some relationships that were6
goods. These elasticities are restricted to be greater than unity to guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium.
An individual is either unemployed or employed in one of the two sectors. The individual
consequently receives unemployment benefits,  %, or labour income, ZL. In addition, non-
labour income in terms of a share of profits,p , adds to the individual income. Profits are
assumed to be equally distributed across individuals. The budget constraint then takes the form








== åå 11 ,
where ,Z LL =+ p  if employed and ,% L =+ p  if unemployed. The price levels for the two






















































The general price level in the economy is calculated as a cost-of-living index based on the
utility for the two types of goods in (1) and takes the form:
(5) 33 3 FV =
- aa 1 .
Consumers choose an optimal bundle of commodities given their budget constraints. The
externality affecting consumers’ utility is taken as given since the consumers can not influence
the use of energy in production. The parameters a and 1￿a are the fixed fractions of income
that the consumer allocates to consumption of the traded and the non-traded goods. From the
                                                                                                                                           
SRVWXODWHG in that model (e.g. fixed relative wages) are GHULYHG in our analysis.7
solution of the consumer’s maximisation problem, we can derive the demand function facing a























, M 1,..., NV ,
where, is the aggregate income in the economy. The market demand for good  depends on
the firm’s price relative to the general price level in the sheltered sector. The closer substitutes
the goods are, i.e. the higher is s, the more costly it is in terms of reduced demand to increase
the price above the general sector price. The elasticity of substitution,  s, is thus the demand
elasticity facing firms as well. The total income is deflated by the general sector price. There
will hence be no cross price effects between the two sectors. This follows from the fact that
individuals assign a fixed share, 1a, of their income to consumption of non-tradable goods.
Let NF
K be the fixed number of varieties of the tradable good that is produced domestically. The
demand function facing an arbitrary firm producing a variety that is consumed domestically as
























0 is the world aggregate income, i.e. ,, ,
0 =+, where  , is the aggregate income in the rest
of the world. We will take the rest-of-the-world real income,,3 F / , as exogenous throughout
the analysis.  4 The properties of the demand function facing firms in the tradable sector is
analogous to the one for firms in the sheltered sector. The demand elasticity is given by m .
2.2 The Firms
                                                
4 To arrive at these particular demand functions we have assumed that consumers have identical
preferences across countries. Less restrictive assumptions can be made without altering the results.8
There are a fixed number of firms operating in each sector. Firms in the  GEV
choose labour and energy so as to maximise profits given the technology, producer wage and
demand they face. Labour is immobile between countries whereas energy is mobile and
imported at a fixed (foreign currency) price from abroad. Let the technology be represented by
a production function with constant returns to scale given by
(8) \Q H VV V = - dd 1 ,0 ￿d￿1,
where Q andHVare the amount of labour and energy used in production in a representative
firm. The profit-maximising price for a particular firm is given as:




11 () () ,
dd
1￿￿￿￿￿ V .
F1 is a constant that depends on d and s.5 WQ and WH are the tax rates on labour and energy and
T is the domestic pre-tax price of energy. Cost minimisation implies
() () () () Q H FRQVW T W Z W VV H V Q // =+ + 11 , which together with (6), (8) and (9) yield the wage
elasticity of labour demand at the firm level:-= ¶¶ ln ln QZ VV / () ds-+ 11 .
Since all firms in the sheltered sector face the same problem, all prices will be set equal in the
sector in a symmetric equilibrium. The general price of non- tradables is thus given by eq. (9).
By using the relations derived from firms’ optimisation and imposing equilibrium in the product





















F2 andF3 are constants including technology and preference parameters as well as the number
of varieties available of the non-traded goods. We notice that there will be no cross price
                                                
5 All constants are defined as positive and shown in an appendix.9
effects between the demand for the two factors in equilibrium. When the price of energy
increases, the demand for energy, as well as the demand for labour, falls for a given general
sector price. This follows from the fact that the factors are gross complements in demand. In
equilibrium, however, the general sector price increases since it is a weighted average of the
energy price and the producer wage. This has a twofold effect on each firm’s demand for
labour. A higher sector price reduces the firm’s relative price, which increases the demand for
the firm’s product and thereby the firm’s demand for labour. There will, however, also be a
negative effect due to the decline in aggregate real demand for non- tradables; this reduces the
demand for the firm’s product and thereby also its demand for labour. The positive effect on
the demand for labour dominates, however. This positive effect completely outweighs the
direct negative cross price effect. In equilibrium there will thus be no effects from changes in
the price of energy on the demand for labour. Analogous properties hold for the firm’s
equilibrium demand for energy in the sheltered sector.
In the WFW , the production technology is represented by a constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas function given by
(12) \Q H FF F = - gg 1 ,   01 << g ,
where QF and  F are the amount of labour and energy used in a representative firm. The firm’s
profit-maximising price, and the demand for labour and energy, are obtained as:
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(13) () []
( ) () []
( )( ) () QF Z W TW 3 ,3 FF QH F F =+ +
-- - - - -
5
11 1 1 0 11
gm g m m / ,
() []
( ) () []
( )( ) () H FZ W T W 3 , 3 FF QHF F =+ +
-- - - - -
6
11 1 1 0 11
gm g m m / .
F5 and F6 are constants that depend on the parameters of preferences and technology. The
wage elasticity of labour demand is thus given as () -= - + ¶¶ g m ln ln QZ FF /1 1 .10
The two factors of production are gross complements in demand; an increase in the unit cost of
one factor reduces the use of both factors. In general equilibrium, domestic firms producing
tradables will set the same prices since they face the same conditions. We will, however, not
impose symmetric world equilibrium in the sense that the prices will be set equal across firms in
different countries. This implies that the general price of  tradables in general will differ from
the price of domestically produced tradables, i.e.33 FKF ¹ . Furthermore, with the volume of
domestically produced goods traded on the world market being small relative to the world
trade, there will be a negligible impact on the general price of  tradables from changes in the
price of the domesticallly produced goods.
2.3 The Unions6
There is one union in each firm and each union cares about the utility of its members. The





L * =- ,
where ,L is the state-dependent income. Workers are concerned with their expected lifetime
utility, and consider the possibility of transitions across sectors and labour force states. Define
9F
K,  9F as the expected lifetime utility of a worker employed in a particular firm  K, and an
arbitrary firm, in the tradable sector; 9V
M ,  9V as the expected lifetime utility of a worker
employed in a particular firm  M, and an arbitrary firm, in the sheltered sector; and 9X as the
expected lifetime utility of an unemployed individual. Assuming an infinite time horizon we can
write the value functions as: 7
                                                
6 The model of unions and wage bargaining draws heavily on Holmlund (1996) and Kolm (1996).
7 The probability that an unemployed worker will get an offer from both sectors at the same time is











































%￿is nominal unemployment benefits,  U is the discount rate and [L is the exogenous probability
that a worker is separated from his job in sector L. The probability of leaving unemployment for
employment in sector L is denoted DL. The workers possess no sector-specific skills and move
between firms through a spell of unemployment. On-the-job search and job-to-job mobility are
ruled out by assumption.
From (15) we can derive expressions for the utility differences between employment and


















































9 is the utility value of outside opportunities net of the share of profits and the  disutility of
pollution, i.e.,  () 99 U 3Y H X º- + (/) / () 1 p . Non-labour income and the disutility of pollution
do not affect the utility differences between employment and unemployment since they are
state-independent.  9  is common for all workers since their former labour market histories are
irrelevant for the job-finding probabilities.
2.4 Wage Bargaining
The nominal wage is set in decentralised union-firm bargains, while the firms determine
employment. The general price level is taken as given in these negotiations. Wages are chosen
according to Nash bargains of the form:12
(17)
() () [] () () () []
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X -  for the sheltered sector. () 5K .  and () 5M .  are the firms’
revenues. The parameters lF and lV measure the relative bargaining power of the unions
relative to the firms, with 0￿lL￿1, for  =F, V. The wage bargains recognise that the firms will
unilaterally determine employment and energy consumption, i.e., () QQ Z F
K
FF
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,   1￿￿￿￿￿NV .
Each wage is then given as a constant mark-up on the measure of outside opportunities.
Differences in mark-ups between the two sectors depend on sectoral differences in bargaining
power (lF vs. lV) as well as parameters of preferences and technology. The larger is s  or d ,
the larger is the wage elasticity of labour demand and the lower is the mark-up in the sheltered
sector. Analogously, the larger is g orm , the lower is the mark-up in the tradable sector.
Wages are in equilibrium set equal across the bargaining units within each sector, an
implication of the fact that all union-firm pairs within a sector have identical technologies and
face the same maximisation problem.
From equations (18) and (19) we obtain the relative wage: ]ZZ V F º / . Since all workers face
the same outside opportunities the relative wage takes the form:13













The relative wage is thus fixed by preference and technology parameters as well as by the
measure of union bargaining power. The relative wage obviously increases in the bargaining
power of the unions in the sheltered sector, l V, while it falls in the unions’ relative bargaining
power in the tradable sector, lF. It will also increase in g  andm  while it falls in  d and s. The
lower the wage elasticity of labour demand in the sheltered sector relative to the labour
demand elasticity in the tradable sector, the higher is the relative wage in the sheltered sector.
Flow equilibrium requires equality between the inflow of workers to a sector ( hirings) and the










With the labour force normalised to unity we have QF, QV andX in levels as well as in rates,
and the labour force identity given by1=++ QQX F V .
In a symmetric equilibrium, outside opportunities are given by a probability-weighted average
of the utilities in the different states. The probabilities are the expected fractions of time spent
in the different states. For simplicity, we focus on the case when the discount rate approaches
zero.8 Using (21) as well as the labour force identity we can write the outside opportunities,












V =+ + .
                                                
8 The value functions are not defined when the discount rate is strictly zero. The analysis is valid as an
approximation when the discount rate is arbitrarily close to zero. We assume that the parameters are
such that all job offers are accepted.14
The wage equations in (18) and (19) can be expressed as an equilibrium relationship between
employment in the two sectors, QF and QV, by eliminating 9  by means of eq. (22) and by











where F7  is a constant, and F7 1. The parameterE is the constant replacement ratio with the
unemployment benefits indexed to the average wage in the tradable sector, i.e., %E Z F = ; the
results of the paper do not hinge on which of the sector’s wages benefits are indexed to. The
wage from working must be higher than the benefit level, i.e.  E]  and E 1, to ensure the
existence of the two sectors. The magnitude of the relative wage, ], plays a crucial role in
determining the trade-off between employment in the two sectors. If wages are equal in the
sectors, i.e. ] 1, an increase in employment in the sheltered sector will be exactly offset by a
decrease in employment in the tradable sector. On the other hand, if the wage in the sheltered
sector is lower than the wage in the tradable sector, i.e. ] 1, an expansion of sheltered
employment will not be completely offset by a fall in employment in the tradable sector. 9
Consider an exogenous increase in the demand for labour in the sheltered sector and suppose
that ]<1 holds. This increases the value attached to unemployment, which induces higher wage
demands. Lower employment in the tradable sector follows as a consequence. The expansion
of employment in the sheltered sector thus crowds out employment in the tradable sector. A
wage premium for workers in the tradable sector will restrain the wage push since the relative
probability for an unemployed worker of getting a job in the higher paying sector has
decreased. The fall in employment in the tradable sector will therefore not completely offset
the increase in employment in the sheltered sector.
2.5 The Trade Balance
The trade balance is defined as the difference between the value of exports and the value of
imports:
                                                
9 If the labour market were competitive we would have F7=]=1 and (23) would simply state that total
employment is equal to the labour force, i.e., QF+QV=1.15
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The value of exports is given by the value of what is not consumed domestically of the
NF






= å 1 . The value of imports is given by the value of the NN FF
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= å , as well as the value of the imported energy, i.e.
() TH H F V + . Balanced trade requires that there must be positive net exports of the domestically
produced traded goods to cover imports of energy as well as imports of the traded goods
produced abroad.
By substituting each sector’s demand for labour and energy into (24) and imposing  7%=0
("external balance") we can derive a relationship between real income, measured in units of the






















































FF 81 0 -  are constants and FF 91 0 > .  () 7W H  is decreasing in the energy tax rate, i.e.,  () ¢< 7W H 0.
Recall that , 3, , 3 FF
0 ￿￿￿ ￿ =+ , where foreign real income, , 3 F ￿ , is exogenous. The trade
balance condition in eq. (25) can accordingly be viewed as a relationship between two
endogenous variables, namely domestic real income (in terms of  tradeables) and the real
producer wage in the tradeable sector. The real energy price is exogenous by virtue of the
assumption of a small open economy, where domestic influences on the general price in the
tradeable sector are negligible.16
It is clear from eq. (25) that a rise in the real pre-tax energy price () T3 F ￿  is QRW equivalent to
an increase in the energy tax. A rise in the real pre-tax energy price worsens the trade balance,
which has to be offset by increased exports and/or reduced imports. This is accomplished
through a lower real producer wage in the tradable sector and a lower real income. A rise in
the energy tax has similar but not identical effects. The reason is that the value of imports is
determined by the SUH￿WD[￿ energy price () T , whereas the firm’s demand for inputs are
determined by the V  energy price  () () TW H 1+ . The effects of an energy tax on the trade
balance work only through the real factor prices, while a higher energy price in addition has a
"direct" negative impact on the trade balance by making imports more expensive. The fact that
a higher energy tax does not have this direct negative effect on the trade balance appears as a
positive effect in eq. (25) and is captured by the function () 7W H .
2.6 General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium of the economy can be given a simple representation by means of four
equations. We combine the aggregate labour demand relationship for the tradable sector,
obtained from eq. (13) after multiplication with the number of firms, with the trade balance
equation (25); this makes it possible to obtain a relationship, given by  eq. (27) below, between
tradable sector employment and real income, the latter measured in wage units of the tradable
sector. The remaining equations have already been derived and are repeated for convenience.
Eq (28) is the aggregate labour demand relationship for the sheltered sector, eq. (29) the
relative wage, and eq. (30) the trade-off between sectoral employment levels that is implied by










































These equations determine employment in the two sectors as well as real income in wage cost
units. A graphical representation is given in  )LJX  1. Eqs. (27) and (28), the two aggregate
labour demand schedules, are illustrated in the second and fourth quadrants in the figure.
Quadrant 3 displays the relative wage line given by (29). The trade-off between employment in
the two sectors given by (30) is illustrated by the negatively sloped line in the first quadrant.
The labour demand relationships and the relative wage line can be combined to trace out the
positively sloped locus in the first quadrant. The equation of this locus is obtained from  eqs.







H =× 13 .
Since the relative wage is fixed by  eq. (20), the relative equilibrium employment is determined
by the relative sector demand for labour. The government can determine the relative sector
employment in the economy through its choice of energy tax. By using (30) together with (31)
we can solve for the equilbrium levels of employment in the two sectors. The solution of the
system is illustrated in the first quadrant of Figure 1. Note that the labour tax does   affect












this solution, whereas the energy tax rate does. The tax rate on labour has thus no effect on
relative or total employment.10
We also note that real energy prices are absent from eqs. (27)-(30), implying that higher energy
prices, like labour taxes, have no effect on sectoral or total employment. Recall that a higher
price of energy reduces the demand for labour in the tradable sector in  LOO  equilibrium, due
to the negative cross price effect; cf. eq. (13). This negative effect is completely offset in
JO  equilibrium by the induced trade balance adjustments.
                                                
10 If the payroll tax rate is increased, the immediate effect would be a drop in each sector’s labour
demand. The threat of increased unemployment would induce wage moderation, which in turn leads to
a downward adjustment of real unemployment benefits through the fixed replacement ratio. This
process continues until real producer wages have returned to their initial values. If however the payroll
tax increases were GLIIHUHQWLDWHG between the two sectors, relative demand and thereby possibly total
employment could be affected; see Kolm (1996).19
The tax revenues are used to finance unemployment benefits. The tax on energy is adjusted so
as to keep the government’s budget balanced. The government’s budget restriction is given as
(32) () ( ) W Z Q Z Q W TH TH Q Q EZ QF F V V H F V F V F ++ + = - - () 1 ,
which can be rewritten as















÷ ÷ ++ = - - * () ( ) 11 ,
where ZZ W FF Q
* º+ () 1  is the nominal wage cost in the tradable sector. The labour tax rate can
be computed residually from (32’) once the energy tax rate and the endogenous variables of the
model are determined. By using eqs. (27)-(30) together with the trade balance condition in eq.
(25) we can determine the real after-tax producer wage, i.e., Z3 FF
* / . Total energy
consumption is obtained by invoking  eqs. (11) and (13) and can be written as:


















The labour tax rate is thus determined from (32’) as a function of the exogenous real energy
price, the replacement ratio, the energy tax rate and the endogenously determined real
variables.
2.7 Employment Effects of an Energy Tax
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where FF F 14 7 13 =  and ¶¶ Q W V H / > 0, ¶¶ QW FH / < 0. The tax rate on energy will thus always
influence the sectoral allocation of employment. A higher energy tax reduces employment in
the tradable sector while employment in the sheltered sector increases. The immediate effect is
that the demand for employment in the tradable sector drops for given pre-tax wages. This
reduces the value of outside opportunities, which induces wage moderation in both sectors.
This wage moderation dampens the decline in demand for labour in the tradable sector while
the demand for labour in the sheltered sector increases.
The unemployment rate can be derived from (34) together with the labour force identity,  i.e,
XQ Q F V =- - 1.  We obtain:
(35)
















The effect on unemployment of an increase in the energy tax is given as:
(35)
() ()































If wages are equal in the sectors, i.e. ]=1, the increased employment in the sheltered sector
exactly offsets the fall in employment in the tradable sector. There is thus no effect on the
unemployment rate in this case. If, on the other hand, there is a wage premium in the tradable
sector, i.e. ]<1, there is a possibility of reducing unemployment by increasing the tax on
energy. A higher energy tax induces a reallocation of employment from the tradable to the21
sheltered sector and this have effects on total employment to the extent that the unions’
bargaining power in the labour market, or firms’ monopoly power in the product market, differ
across the two sectors. A reallocation of employment towards the sector where the unions
and/or the firms have less market power would thus increase total employment.
￿￿￿:HOIDUH￿$QDO\VLV
We will now briefly consider the normative issues. To that end we make use of a utilitarian
social welfare function given as the sum of the individual indirect utility functions:
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QF and QV are the number of individuals employed in the tradable and sheltered sectors and  X￿is
the number of unemployed.PF 3 /  and P 3 /  are total real profits in the two sectors and
() YH H F V +  captures the disutility from the aggregate use of energy.
Substituting the expressions for profits, () () PFF KF K K
N
FQ F H F 3 \Z W Q TW H
F
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= å 1 11  and
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= å 1 11 , into (36) and making use of the government
budget restriction in (32) as well as the condition for balanced trade, 7%=0, we can rewrite the
welfare function as:
(37) () () ( ) 6: 3 3 ’ 3 ’ Y H H FF VV F V =+ - + 1/ .
The first component is real *’3 and the second captures the disutility from the aggregate use
of the polluting factor of production. By invoking the expression for the aggregate price level























In order to determine the effect of an energy tax on *’3 we thus need to determine the effects
on the real income in terms of tradeables as well as the relative price of non- tradables. There
are a number of effects involved, which are briefly discussed in an appendix. The impact on
*’3 is in general ambiguous.
The equilibrium relationship between total energy consumption and the energy tax, conditional
on real income in units of tradables is given by eq. (33). Total energy consumption is reduced
by higher energy taxes through the "7-effect" as well as by the rise in the real unit cost of
energy. There will however also be an impact on real income, which can not be signed in
general. Somewhat surprisingly, the general  equlibrium effect on energy consumption of a rise
in the energy tax is ambiguous. 11
We have undertaken some numerical simulation experiments to explore the consequences of a
tax reform that involves introduction of an energy tax and a concomitant adjustment of the
payroll tax so as to keep the government’s budget balanced.  7DEOH 1 presents the results for
three different parameter configurations corresponding to three different relative wages. We
make no attempt to measure the impact on social welfare since this would require explicit
assumptions regarding the valuation of environmental benefits. 12 We focus on the impact on
energy consumption (pollution), *’3 and unemployment.
Total energy consumption is substantially reduced in all experiments that we have performed.
It is striking how small the effects on  *’3 and unemployment appear to be for modest energy
tax rates, irrespective of the parameter configurations. *’3 is always reduced when wages are
equal across sectors as well as when there is a wage premium in the sheltered sector; the
decline amounts to approximately 2 percent when the energy tax rate is increased from zero to
100 percent, allowing a cut in the payroll tax rate of roughly 5 percentage points.
                                                
11 A similar ambiguity is present in other models as well. Carraro et al (1996) report simulations of
energy taxation to control carbon emission using a large general equilibrium model. They find find that
there is typically no long run effect on emissions and in some cases the tax reform produces KLJKHU
emission levels.
12 For particular functional forms of Y(H), such as YH H ()= q r , with q > 0 and  r ³1, there exists an
RSWLPDO tax rate on energy in this model.23
Table 1. Environmental tax reform with fixed replacement ratios.
] WH WQ QF￿QV H *’3 X Double
￿￿ ￿ dividend
1 0 5.88 1.174 100.0 100.0 10.53 -
1 25 3.58 1.137 78.72 99.72 10.53 No
1 50 2.10 1.113 64.70 99.19 10.53 No
1 100 0.31 1.083 47.44 97.92 10.53 No
1.25 0 5.67 4.057 100.0 100.0 10.65 -
1.25 25 3.46 3.957 78.30 99.64 10.81 No
1.25 50 2.05 3.892 64.11 99.04 10.92 No
1.25 100 0.33 3.814 46.75 97.66 11.06 No
0.75 0 8.55 0.129 100.0 100.0 11.82 -
0.75 25 5.05 0.114 70.95 100.2 10.91 Yes
0.75 50 3.03 0.105 53.86 99.77 10.36 No
0.75 100 0.81 0.096 35.07 98.28   9.73 No
1RWHV: The parameters for all cases are as follows: T￿3F= ,3 F ￿ =NF=NV=1,NF
K =0.05, E=0.5. To generate
different wages across sectors, the parameters of technology,dg ￿ , union bargaining power,ll FV ￿ , and
demand elasticities, sm ￿ , are varied.a  is used to calibrate an unemployment rate when ] ¹1.  When
]=1 the parameters are:dg == 09 ￿ ,  ll FV == 02 ￿ ,  sm == 5 and a = 05 ￿ .  When =1.25  the
parameters are: dg == 09 ￿ ,  l F = 005 ￿ ,  l V = 06 ￿ ,  s = 35 ￿ , m = 8  and a = 07 ￿ .When =0.75  the
parameters are:d = 095 ￿ , g = 06 ￿ , l F = 06 ￿ ,l V = 005 ￿ , s = 8 , m = 4 and a = 015 ￿ .
Table 2. Environmental tax reform with fixed real unemployment benefits.
] WH WQ QF/QV H *’3 X Double
dividend
1 0 5.89 1.174 100.0 100.0  10.53 -
1 25 3.56 1.137 78.74 99.75  10.51 No
1 50 2.11 1.113 64.70 99.18  10.53 No
1 100 0.44 1.083 47.38 97.80  10.64 No
1.25 0 5.67 4.057 100.0 100.0  10.65 -
1.25 25 3.48 3.957 78.30 99.63  10.82 No
1.25 50 2.11 3.892 64.07 98.98  10.98 No
1.25 100 0.55 3.814 46.66 97.47  11.25 No
0.75 0 8.56 0.129 100.0 100.0  11.82 -
0.75 25 4.73 0.114 71.09 100.5  10.64 Yes
0.75 50 2.72 0.105 53.97 100.1  10.09 No
0.75 100 0.79 0.096 35.09 98.36   9.66 No
: The same parameters as in table 1 are valid for the three different relative wages. The
replacement ratio, %Z F , is used to calibrate the same initial level of unemployment and is hence set to
0.5 initially.24
We know from the theory that there will be an employment dividend when there is a wage
premium for workers in the tradable sector and the simulations confirm this. In one case, with
a modest energy tax rate, there is also a double dividend in the form of a tiny increase in  *’3.
Notice, however, that an increase in the energy tax rate from zero to 100 percent produces a
reduction in *’3 of almost 2 percent despite the decline in unemployment of 2 percentage
points.
To what extent are these results sensitive to the benefit regime? We have also considered the
case with fixed real unemployment benefits, as opposed to constant replacement ratios; the
results are reported in 7DEOH 2. The results are remarkably similar to those shown in Table 1.
There is virtually no effect on unemployment when  sectoral wages are equal. We suspect that
our specification of labour and energy as  cooperant factors is crucial for this result. A
reduction in energy usage will reduce the marginal productivity of labour and hence the
demand for labour. It is conceivable that a richer production structure (including additional
factors of production) may lead to other results.
￿￿￿&RQFOXGLQJ￿5HPDUNV
We have examined the impact of an environmental tax reform in an imperfectly competitive
small open economy with unemployment in general equilibrium. The reform involves a tax
levied on the use of imported energy, where the revenues are recycled to achieve a payroll tax
cut. We have focused on the case where real unemployment compensation is indexed to the
real consumption wage through a fixed replacement ratio. A key finding is that an
environmental tax reform will reduce equilibrium unemployment provided that unions in the
tradable sector have a stronger bargaining position than unions in the sheltered sector, resulting
in a tradable sector wage premium. If there is a sheltered sector wage premium, the reform will
actually increase unemployment.
Although employment gains are theoretically possible, our simulation experiments suggest that
they are quantitatively small. Moreover, they do not come without cost, as real *’3 typically
falls when the energy tax is increased. This is also the typical outcome when we consider a
benefit regime with fixed real unemployment benefits, as opposed to constant replacement
ratios.25
How plausible is an outcome where a tradable sector wage premium emerges in equilibrium? It
could be argued that firms in the tradable sector in general are unable to exercise much market
power; indeed, a popular model of a small open economy features price-taking firms in the
tradable sector. Absence of significant product market rents would imply negligible rents in the
wage bargains, so a tradable sector wage premium would appear as an unlikely outcome. On
the other hand, there are sheltered (service) sectors which produce goods that are close
substitutes to goods produced within the households, making the price elasticity of demand
quite high. The presence of quasi-fixed capital could also be a source of rents in the wage
bargains, presumably in general favouring workers in the tradable sector (as the share of capital
is higher there). On balance, however, we do not find substantial tradable sector wage
premiums plausible as a long run outcome in a small open economy with international capital
mobility. The case for an environmental tax reform as a means to reduce unemployment would
therefore seem rather weak. This conclusion is broadly in agreement with recent results
reported by Brunello (1996) and Carraro et al (1996) using large-scale econometric general
equilibrium models augmented with non-competitive wage setting mechanisms.26
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The Energy Tax and *’3
To determine the effect of an environmental tax reform on real  *’3 we need to consider the
effects on real income and the relative price of non- tradables; cf. eq. (38) in the main text. This
appendix provides a brief heuristic discussion of some mechanisms involved.
The level of real income is determined by the trade balance condition in (25) for a given level
of the real producer wage in the tradable sector. From eqs. (27)-(30) we can derive a
relationship between the real producer wage, real income and the energy tax of the form

















where () -W H  is given by





















and () ¢ < - .. 0 A rise in the energy tax reduces the demand for labour in the tradable sector,
which causes the wage demands in income units to fall. The " --effect" thus reduces the
producer wage measured in tradable goods.
By substituting the expression for the tradeble sector’s real producer wage (B1) into the trade
balance condition (25) we obtain the level of real income in equilibrium as:
(B3)














































The impact of the energy tax on the trade balance and consequently the real income can be
seen as involving effects via the real energy price, the producer wage measured in income
units, and 7. A higher unit cost of energy worsens the trade balance and reduces real income.30
However, a higher energy tax reduces the wage demands which will improve the trade balance
and consequently increase the real income (the " --effect"). Recall that there will also be a
positive effect on the level of real income due to the direct impact of the " 7-effect" on the trade
balance; this is due to the fact that the energy tax is separable from real energy prices in the
trade balance equation. It turns out to be difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions regarding
the effects of the energy tax on the trade balance and consequently on the level of real income.
The relative price of non-tradables is determined in eq. (9). Rewritten as a function of the real


































where we have made use of the equilibrium relative wage, i.e., ] ZZ V F º / . Recall that the real
































where ,3 F / is determined in (B3). A higher tax on energy increases the real unit costs of
energy which increases the relative price on non- tradables. As a counteracting effect, a higher
energy tax reduces the wage demands which cause the real producer wage and hence the
relative price on non-tradables to fall. These counteracting effects seem intuitive since the
prices of non-tradables are set as a mark-up on marginal costs. In addition, as we previously
concluded, the impact on the real income of the energy tax is inconclusive. This leaves the
impact of the energy tax on the relative price on non-tradables ambiguous.
In conclusion, then, we have that the effect of the energy tax on the real income is ambiguous
due to (i) the positive impact on the trade balance caused by reduced wage demands and the
"7-effect", and (ii) the negative impact on the trade balance caused by a higher real producer31
price on energy. The effect of the energy tax on the relative price is ambiguous as well. This is
due to (i) the positive impact caused by reduced wage demands, (ii) the negative impact caused
by a higher real producer price on energy, and (iii) the ambiguous impact on the real income.